Sven Feurer, Monika C. Schuhmacher, Sabine Kuester, Divide Tariffs and Prosper? A Focus on the Role of Need for Cognition in:

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MAR, Volume 37 (2015), Issue 2, ISSN: 0344-1369, ISSN online: 0344-1369, https://doi.org/10.15358/0344-1369-2015-2-101

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Research Note Sven Feurer is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute of Information Systems and Marketing (IISM), Marketing & Sales Research Group. Zirkel 2, Building 20.21, 76131 Karlsruhe, Germany. Phone: +49 (0) 721 608-4 17 96, Fax: +49 (0) 721 608-4 77 65, E-Mail: sven.feurer@kit.edu Monika C. Schuhmacher is Assistant Professor at the University of Mannheim, Chair of Marketing & Innovation. L5, 1, 68131 Mannheim, Germany. Phone: +49 (0) 621 181-2388, Fax: +49 (0) 621 181-2398, E-Mail: schuhmacher@bwl.unimannheim.de Sabine Kuester is Professor of Marketing at the University of Mannheim, Chair of Marketing & Innovation. L5, 1, 68131 Mannheim, Germany. Phone: +49 (0) 621 181-2388, Fax: +49 (0) 621 181-2398, E-Mail: kuester@bwl.unimannheim.de Divide Tariffs and Prosper? A Focus on the Role of Need for Cognition Sven Feurer, Monika C. Schuhmacher and Sabine Kuester This study presents a conceptual replication of the effect of partitioned prices on consumer responses in a subscription service setting. Contrasting Morwitz/Greenleaf/Johnson’s (1998) seminal article, the results of an online experiment reveal that consumers are more likely to buy a subscription service with a partitioned tariff (i.e., a pay-per-use tariff) than with a combined tariff (i.e., a flat rate). This effect occurs even though all consumers are aware of the correct billing price and the billing price is identical in both conditions. However, the negative effect of the partitioned (vs. the combined) tariff on consumer responses is mitigated by high levels of need for cognition. Intriguingly, consumers extremely high in need for cognition show a reversed effect pattern when examining perceived price fairness as the dependent variable, that is, they perceive the partitioned tariff to be fairer than the combined tariff. 1. Introduction Price partitioning continues to receive considerable attention from researchers (e.g., Homburg/Totzek/Krämer 2014; Lee/Choi/Li 2014; Völckner/Rühle/Spann 2012). Price partitioning refers to the common managerial practice to divide a price in two (or more) mandatory parts (e.g., base price + surcharge). In their seminal article, Morwitz/Greenleaf/Johnson (1998) draw on the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky/Kahneman 1974) to propose that consumers judging prices compromise between the benefit of calculation accuracy and the cost of cognitive effort. Specifically, “consumers are likely to anchor on the base price and then tend to adjust insufficiently upward to incorporate the surcharge” (p. 455). The authors demonstrate that price partitioning negatively influences total costs recalled and hence positively influences demand. Based on the argument of cognitive effort, subsequent research investigates the moderating role of need for cognition (NFC) (Burman/Biswas 2007). Need for cognition refers to a stable dispositional difference in cognitive motivation that is distinguishable from (but related to) intellectual ability (Cacioppo/Petty 1982). More precisely, high NFC customers have “active, exploring minds and, through their senses and intellect, reach and draw out information from their environment” (Cacioppo et al. 1996, p. 199). The aim of this research is to replicate Morwitz/Greenleaf/Johnson’s (1998) work and to incorporate the moderating role of NFC for consumer responses to partitioned prices. MARKETING · ZFP · 37. Jg. · 2/2015 · S. 101–108 101 Experimental conditions: combined tariff partitioned tariff Basic price per month 50.00 € 23.00 € Provision charge - - HSDPA usage inclusive inclusive WLAN Flatrate inclusive inclusive Price per minute for calls ƒ to landline numbers free of charge 0.09 € ƒ to within-network numbers free of charge free of charge ƒ to out-of-network numbers free of charge 0.09 € Prices per SMS ƒ to within-network numbers free of charge free of charge ƒ to out-of-network numbers free of charge 0.09 € Prices per MMS ƒ to within-network numbers free of charge free of charge ƒ to out-of-network numbers free of charge 0.49 € Contract duration 24 months 24 months G1 Smartphone Handset inclusive inclusive Usage pattern (in both experimental conditions): Calls (per month) ƒ landline numbers (100 minutes) ƒ within-network numbers (100 minutes) ƒ out-of-network numbers (100 minutes) Messages (per month) ƒ within-network numbers (100 SMS) ƒ out-of-network numbers (100 SMS) ƒ zero MMS Tab. 1: Experimental Conditions and Usage Pattern 2. Replication: The Effect of Price Partitioning on Purchase Likelihood Similar to the seminal article, the first step is to investigate the effect of price partitioning on purchase likelihood. However, the present study deviates from Morwitz/Greenleaf/Johnson (1998, experiment two) in three major ways. First, we account for the moderating role of NFC that more recent research considers important (Burman/Biswas 2007). Second, the experiment is carried out in a subscription service setting (in our case, a mobile phone tariff). Subscription services are characterized by the prevalence of both strongly partitioned (“pay-per-use”) tariffs and combined (“flat rate”) tariffs because service providers use tariff structures to differentiate from the competition and to benefit from heterogeneity in consumer demand (Lambrecht et al. 2012). Third, a filter question allowed only participants in the final sample who had expended the cognitive effort to calculate the correct monthly billing price, hereby resembling a high involvement situation and eliminating possible effects due to heuristic processing and calculation (in)accuracy by which researchers explain prior results (e.g., Burman/ Biswas 2007; Carlson/Weathers 2008; Kim/Kramer 2006). For instance, Burman/Biswas (2007) argue that low NFC individuals tend to ignore surcharges while high NFC individuals evaluate surcharges separately from the base price. Hence, differences in consumer reactions to partitioned (vs. combined) tariffs occur only for high but not for low NFC individuals. Similarly, Kim/ Kramer (2006) show that the direction of the moderating effect of NFC depends on whether individuals overestimate or underestimate the final price. However, what happens in a situation in which both low and high NFC individuals expend the effort to calculate the final price as accurately as possible? In our research setting and given that high NFC individuals are said to enjoy cognitive work whereas low NFC individuals perceive it as a burden (Cacioppo/Petty 1982), we expect that low NFC individuals’ reactions to partitioned (vs. combined) tariffs are negative and that this effect is reduced for high NFC individuals. 2.1. Method We recruited undergraduate students from a major European university to participate in our experiment. Participants were randomly allocated to two treatment conditions of an online experiment with a one-factorial between-subjects design (tariff structure: partitioned vs. combined). Respondents were given an artificial monthly usage pattern and a partitioned or combined tariff, respectively. Given the monthly usage pattern, the monthly billing price added up to c50 per month in both experimental conditions (see Tab. 1). Note that providing such a usage pattern also rules out most of cognitive and motivational effects that may otherwise lead consumers to prefer a combined over a partitioned tariff (Lambrecht/ Skiera 2006). The final sample consisted of 183 participants (44 % female, and 46 % in the modal age group of 25–29 years). Resulting cell sizes were 95 and 88. Information on the latent constructs appear in the Tab. A1 and Tab. A2. Feurer/Schuhmacher/Kuester, Divide Tariffs and Prosper? A Focus on the Role of Need for Cognition 102 MARKETING · ZFP · Heft 2 · 2. Quartal 2015 Fig. 1: Tariff Structure × NFC Interaction with Purchase Likelihood as Dependent Variable 2.2. Results The perceived cognitive effort was higher in the partitioned tariff than in the combined tariff condition (Mcombined = 2.14, Mpartitioned = 2.85, F(1, 181) = 14.077; p < .001). Thus the manipulation was successful. An ANOVA revealed that the effect of tariff structure on purchase likelihood was negative (Mcombined = 4.56, Mpartitioned = 3.63; F(1, 181) = 10.261, p < .01). To test for moderation, a floodlight analysis was conducted as outlined by Spiller et al. (2013). This procedure is superior to the traditional approach of mean-splitting the continuous variable and then performing a simple two-by-two ANOVA. Spiller and colleagues’ approach involves the identification of the range of NFC for which the simple main effect of tariff structure on purchase likelihood is significant. The “Johnson-Neyman point” marks the crossover value of NFC (where p = .05). Note that tariff structure was dummy-coded (0 = combined, 1 = partitioned) and that this study reports unstandardized regression coefficients. A moderated regression (F(3, 179) = 6.735; p < .001, adjusted R2 = .086) revealed that the slope of NFC was negative (b = –.383, t = –1.901, p > .05) in the combined tariff condition and that the difference in the slopes was significant (b = .851, t = 3.054; p < .01), yielding a NFC slope of .468 in the partitioned tariff condition. Hence, an interaction is established. The Johnson-Neyman point occurred at an NFC value of 5.436 or 0.38 SD above the mean (M = 5.04; SD = 1.03). The negative effect of a partitioned (vs. combined) tariff on purchase likelihood decreases with higher levels of NFC. At values larger than 5.436, the effect is not significant (see Fig. 1; Tab. A3). 3. Extension: The Effect of Price Partitioning on Price Fairness Drawing on behavioral pricing literature, this study additionally examines perceived price fairness as a dependent variable. Price fairness refers to whether a price is perceived as reasonable, acceptable, or just (Bolton/Warlop/ Alba 2003), a construct which has received considerable attention from researchers (e.g., Carlson/Weathers 2008; Xia/Monroe/Cox 2004). A price that is perceived unfair may trigger strong negative customer reactions and thus lead to adverse consequences for firms (Xia/Monroe/Cox 2004). The theory of distributive justice (Homans 1961) suggests that the rewards that consumers expect from an exchange relationship are proportional to their investment in this exchange relationship. In line with recent research (Homburg/Totzek/Krämer 2014) we propose that consumers’ cognitive effort of calculating the final price can be interpreted as “costs of thinking” (Shugan 1980, p. 100). These costs are, then, likely to be included in price fairness judgments. The extent to which this occurs is expected to be conditional on the level of NFC. The effect of a partitioned (versus combined) tariff on price fairness was negative (Mcombined = 5.25, Mpartitioned = 4.68; F(1, 181) = 7.995, p < .01). A moderated regression on price fairness (F(3, 179) = 7.738; p < .001; adj. R2 = .100) revealed that the slope of NFC in the combined tariff condition was negative and significant (b = –.411, t = –3.025, p < .01). The slope difference was .716 and significant (t = 3.808, p < .001), yielding a positive slope of .305 in the partitioned tariff condition. Hence, an interaction is established. Two Johnson-Neyman points are identifiable, at NFC values of 5.280 and 6.939, respectively. The simple main effect of the partitioned (versus combined) tariff on price fairness is negative and significant for NFC values smaller than 5.280, not significant for values between 5.280 and 6.939, and positive and significant for extremely high NFC values larger than 6.939 (see Fig. 2; Tab. A4). Feurer/Schuhmacher/Kuester, Divide Tariffs and Prosper? A Focus on the Role of Need for Cognition MARKETING · ZFP · Heft 2 · 2. Quartal 2015 103 5.280 6.939 Notes: *significant based on a 95% confidence interval; n.s.not significant PL: purchase likelihood; PF: price fairness Bootstrap analysis is based on 5,000 resamples adummy coded (0 = combined, 1 = partitioned) ̃1.394* ̃ .963* ̃ .533* ̃ .102n.s. .329n.s. Fig. 2: Tariff Structure × NFC Interaction with Price Fairness as Dependent Variable Fig. 3: Bootstrap Analysis of Moderated Mediation Additionally, as prior research suggests (e.g., Xia/Monroe/Cox 2004), we considered the possibility that price fairness mediates the relationship between tariff structure and purchase likelihood, and that NFC moderates this mediation. To test for these effects, we conducted a bootstrap test of moderated mediation (Preacher/Rucker/Hayes 2007). The results revealed that the direct effect of tariff structure on purchase likelihood is not significant when accounting for price fairness, indicating a full mediation (–.425; 95 % CI: [–.905, .055]). Furthermore, as Fig. 3 and Tab. A5 show, the magnitude of the indirect effect of tariff structure on purchase likelihood through price fairness is conditional on the level of NFC (.716; [.324, 1.109]). 4. Conclusion 4.1. Summary and Discussion This study contributes to research on the moderating role that NFC has for consumer reactions to partitioned prices. The insights of this replication study are of value for researchers “facing complications in accurately modeling consumers’ choice decisions between alternative offerings [that] arise from complex, often nonlinear, pricing structures” (Lambrecht et al. 2012, p. 424). Taken together, this article provides only little support for Morwitz/Greenleaf/Johnson’s (1998) results. Although price partitioning is perceived favorably in terms of price fairness by consumers with (extremely) high Feurer/Schuhmacher/Kuester, Divide Tariffs and Prosper? A Focus on the Role of Need for Cognition 104 MARKETING · ZFP · Heft 2 · 2. Quartal 2015 Burman/Biswas (2007) Study 1: Surcharge as a percentage of the base price Study 2: Surcharge as a function of size/weight Study 3: Surcharge as a function of delivery time Experiment 1: Reasonable surcharge Experiment 2: Unreasonable surcharge Experiment 1: Reasonable surcharge given the size Experiment 2: Unreasonable surcharge given the size Experiment 1: Reasonable surcharge (overnight delivery) Experiment 2: Unreasonable surcharge (7-10 day delivery) Effective sample N = 81 N = 83 N = 60 N = 97 N = 105 N = 91 Scenario airline ticket airline ticket DVD player camera PDA PDA Experimental Variable(s) price presentation: combined vs. partitioned price presentation: combined vs. partitioned price presentation: combined vs. partitioned price presentation: combined vs. partitioned price presentation: combined vs. partitioned price presentation: combined vs. partitioned Price Stimulus combined: $288.50 partitioned: ƒ base price: $249.00 ƒ surcharge: $39.50 combined: $328.50 partitioned: ƒ base price: $249.00 ƒ surcharge: $79.50 combined: $169.98 partitioned: ƒ base price: $149.99 ƒ surcharge: $19.99 combined: $169.98 partitioned: ƒ base price: $149.99 ƒ surcharge: $19.99 combined: $219.98 partitioned: ƒ base price: $199.99 ƒ surcharge: $19.99 combined: $219.98 partitioned: ƒ base price: $199.99 ƒ surcharge: $19.99 Dependent Variable(s) PV; PL PV; PL PV; PL PV; PL PV; PL PV; PL Results with regard to NFC high NFC: PVpartitioned = 4.41 PVcombined = 3.55 ** PLpartitioned = 4.30 PLcombined = 2.83 ** low NFC: PVpartitioned = 3.57 PVcombined = 3.64 n.s. PLpartitioned = 3.19 PLcombined = 3.28 n.s. high NFC: PVpartitioned = 3.29 PVcombined = 4.17 * PLpartitioned = 3.00 PLcombined = 4.47 ** low NFC: PVpartitioned = 3.53 PVcombined = 3.31 n.s. PLpartitioned = 3.27 PLcombined = 2.93 n.s. high NFC: PVpartitioned = 5.23 PVcombined = 4.10 ** PLpartitioned = 5.00 PLcombined = 3.97 * low NFC: PVpartitioned = 4.12 PVcombined = 4.65 n.s. PLpartitioned = 4.26 PLcombined = 4.73 n.s. high NFC: PVpartitioned = 3.33 PVcombined = 4.33 ** PLpartitioned = 3.18 PLcombined = 4.63 *** low NFC: PVpartitioned = 3.91 PVcombined = 3.92 n.s. PLpartitioned = 4.02 PLcombined = 3.91 n.s. high NFC: PVpartitioned = 4.98 PVcombined = 3.96 ** PLpartitioned = 5.31 PLcombined = 3.86 *** low NFC: PVpartitioned = 4.34 PVcombined = 4.47 n.s. PLpartitioned = 4.60 PLcombined = 4.31 n.s. high NFC: PVpartitioned = 4.11 PVcombined = 4.90 *** PLpartitioned = 4.00 PLcombined = 4.88 ** low NFC: PVpartitioned = 4.47 PVcombined = 4.53 n.s. PLpartitioned = 4.69 PLcombined = 4.52 n.s. Notes: PV = perceived value; PL = purchase likelihood; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; n.s.=not significant T ab.2:Sum m ary ofBurm an/Biswas’(2007)findings Feurer/S chuhm acher/K uester,D ivid e Tariffs and P rosp er? A Focus on the R ole ofN eed forC ognition M AR KETING ·ZFP ·H eft2 ·2 .Q u a rtal2015 105 Construct Alpha ITTC CR AVE Mean SD min max Purchase likelihood a .977 .978 .937 4.12 2.02 1.00 7.00 Rate the probability that you would purchase the product unlikely – likely .946 improbable – probable .973 impossible – possible .934 Perceived price fairness b .900 .900 .694 4.98 1.37 1.25 7.00 The price is fair. .811 The price is justified. .712 The price is unfair. (r) .799 The price is a rip-off. (r) .789 Need for cognition b .751 .760 .512 5.04 1.03 1.33 7.00 I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. .595 I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. .616 The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. .540 ameasured on a 7 point semantic differential scale bmeasured on a 7 point Likert scale anchored 1 = fully disagree, 7 = fully agree NFC, the effect of a partitioned (vs. combined) tariff on purchase likelihood and on price fairness, respectively, is generally negative. This finding is also in contrast to Carlson/Weathers’ (2008) findings that partitioning into a large number of (usage independent) components has a positive impact on price fairness and purchase intentions if the total price is presented. In our chosen research setting, however, the total billing price always depends on consumers’ consumption, transferring much of the cognitive effort to the consumer, may they be high or low NFC individuals. Consequently, our results provide further evidence for a moderating effect of NFC. However, the nature of the moderating effect contrasts Burman/Biswas (2007) who find that consumer reactions to partitioned (vs. combined) tariffs on purchase likelihood differs for high but not for low levels of NFC (Burman/Biswas 2007). Rather, the pattern we find suggests that strong differences in consumer reactions to partitioned (vs. combined) tariffs occur for low NFC consumers. This effect is presumably attributable to the fact that the research setting forced low NFC individuals to carry out a cognitively demanding task. Intriguingly, the present research shows a reversed pattern of effects across levels of NFC which cannot be attributed to a heuristic processing of price information but to costs of thinking (Shugan 1980). The data confirm that individuals with high levels of NFC appreciate thinking as a benefit of the offer rather than a cost. Tab. 2 summarizes Burman/Biswas’ (2007) results in the literature concerning the effect of NFC in the context of partitioned prices and the results of the present study. 4.2. Implications and Future Research Service providers typically offer various alternative tariff structures, consisting of a monthly fee plus several payper-use surcharges. The present study contributes to the notion that consumers’ tariff choice frequently contradicts the fundamental assumption that customers maximize their surplus by choosing the tariff with the lowest billing price (Lambrecht/Skiera 2006). Taken together, this study adds to our understanding of consumer reactions to tariff structures (e.g., Homburg/Totzek/Krämer 2014; Lambrecht/Skiera 2006). Specifically, service managers may need to balance potential benefits of price partitioning with potential drawbacks triggered by price (un)fairness, and they need to account for the NFC of different consumer segments. Although it may be difficult to use NFC as a segmentation criterion, marketers can avoid a pricing approach that is likely to be perceived negatively by an important group of consumers (Burman/Biswas 2007). Future research should replicate our findings in different service contexts and with different samples. Researchers could also investigate contextual factors under which low NFC individuals may, perhaps untypically, choose to engage in the cognitive effort despite the pain associated with this effort. Likewise, research could investigate contextual factors under which high NFC individuals may equally engage in heuristic processing. Appendixes Tab. A1: Measurements Feurer/Schuhmacher/Kuester, Divide Tariffs and Prosper? A Focus on the Role of Need for Cognition 106 MARKETING · ZFP · Heft 2 · 2. Quartal 2015 1 2 3 1 Purchase likelihood .968 2 Price fairness .635 .833 3 Need for cognition .022 –.036 .716 Note: The bold numbers in the diagonal are the square root of the average variance extracted, all other numbers are the bivariate correlations unstandardized regression coefficient t-value p-value Moderated regression for Johnson-Neyman point 5.436 constant 4.400 20.362 .000 tariff structure –.604 –1.975 .050 NFC –.383 –1.901 .059 NFC × tariff structure .851 3.054 .003 Moderated regression for minimum NFC (1.33) constant 5.969 7.804 .000 tariff structure –4.096 –3.817 .000 NFC –.383 –1.901 .059 NFC × tariff structure .851 3.054 .003 Moderated regression for maximum NFC (7.00) constant 3.800 8.469 .000 tariff structure .731 1.186 .237 NFC –.383 –1.901 .059 NFC × tariff structure .851 3.054 .003 Notes: F(3, 179) = 6.735; p < .001; adjusted R² = .086. Tariff structure is dummy-coded (0 = combined, 1 = partitioned). NFC was mean-centered prior to analysis. unstandardized regression coefficient t-value p-value Moderated regression at Johnson-Neyman point 5.280 constant 5.134 37.042 .000 tariff structure –.390 –1.976 .050 NFC –.411 –3.025 .003 NFC × tariff structure .716 3.808 .000 Moderated regression at Johnson-Neyman point 6.939 constant 4.452 15.104 .000 tariff structure .798 1.969 .050 NFC –.411 –3.025 .003 NFC × tariff structure .716 3.808 .000 Moderated regression at minimum NFC (1.33) constant 6.755 13.092 .000 tariff structure –3.217 –4.444 .000 NFC –.411 –3.025 .003 NFC × tariff structure .716 3.808 .000 Moderated regression at maximum NFC (7.00) constant 4.425 14.621 .000 tariff structure .844 2.030 .044 NFC –.411 –3.025 .003 NFC × tariff structure .716 3.808 .000 Notes: F(3, 179) = 7.738; p < .001; adjusted R² = .100. Tariff structure is dummy-coded (0 = combined, 1 = partitioned). NFC was mean-centered prior to analysis. unstandardized regression coefficient t-value p-value Outcome: Price Fairness (F(3, 179) = 10.386; p < .001; R² = .115) constant 7.303 13.523 .000 tariff structure –4.172 –4.159 .000 NFC –.411 –3.542 .001 NFC × tariff structure .716 3.603 .000 Outcome: Purchase Likelihood (F(2, 180) = 89.665; p < .001; R² = .414) constant –.168 –.392 .696 price fairness .902 11.948 .000 tariff structure –.425 –1.747 .082 Conditional indirect effects of tariff structure on purchase likelihood Bootstrap Analysisa Value of NFC Indirect effect 95% CI 3.667 (10th percentile) a × b = –1.394 –2.039 –.810 4.333 (25th percentile) a × b = –.963 –1.417 –.563 5.000 (50th percentile) a × b = –.533 –.882 –.202 5.667 (75th percentile) a × b = –.102 –.520 .316 6.333 (90th percentile a × b = .329 –.226 .936 Notes: Indirect effect: Tariff structurebĺ a ĺ Price fairness ĺ bĺ Purchase likelihood a based on 5,000 resamples b Tariff structure is dummy-coded (0 = combined, 1 = partitioned). Tab. A2: Correlation Analysis and Discriminant Validity Tab. A3: Moderated Regression Models for Purchase Likelihood as Dependent Variable Tab. A4: Moderated Regression Models for Price Fairness as Dependent Variable Tab. A5: Regression Models for Moderated Mediation and Bootstrap Analysis of Indirect Effects References Bolton, L./Warlop, L./Alba, J. (2003): Consumer perceptions of price (un) fairness, in: Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 29 No. 4, pp. 474–491. Burman, B./Biswas, A. (2007): Partitioned pricing: Can we always divide and prosper?, in: Journal of Retailing, Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 423–436. Cacioppo, J. T./Petty, R. E. (1982): The need for cognition, in: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 116–131. Cacioppo, J. T./Petty, R. E., Feinstein/J. A./Jarvis, W./Blair, G. (1996): Dispositional differences in cognitive motivation: The life and times of individuals varying in need for cognition, in: Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 119, No. 2, pp. 197–253. 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(2006): Paying too much and being happy about it: Existence, causes and consequences of tariff-choice biases, in: Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 212–223. Lambrecht, A./Seim, K./Vilcassim, N./Cheema, A./Chen, Y./Crawford, G. S./Hosanagar, K./Iyengar, R./Koenigsberg, O./Lee, R./ Miravete, E. J./Sahin, O. (2012): Price discrimination in service industries, in: Marketing Letters, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 423–438. Feurer/Schuhmacher/Kuester, Divide Tariffs and Prosper? A Focus on the Role of Need for Cognition MARKETING · ZFP · Heft 2 · 2. Quartal 2015 107 Von Christine Behle und Renate vom Hofe. 4. Auflage 2014. XIII, 430 Seiten. Gebunden € 79,– ISBN 978-3-8006-4773-6 Portofrei geliefert: vahlen.de/13172229 Die Kunst des Verkaufens Ob Berufseinsteiger oder Verkaufsprofi – in diesem Handbuch finden Sie hilfreiche Strategien und wirkungsvolle Argumente für Ihren Arbeitsalltag im Außendienst. Die Autoren veranschaulichen klassisches wie aktuelles Know-how und helfen bei der Umsetzung von Trends. Die Schwerpunkte ■ Kundengewinnung und Kundenbindung, ■ Gebietsmanagement und Verkaufsstrategien, ■ Verkaufspsychologie und Preisgespräche. vahlen.de | Verlag Franz Vahlen GmbH · 80791 München | bestellung@vahlen.de | Preise inkl. MwSt. | 163059 Know-how für erfolgreiche Verkäufer. Lee, K./Choi, J./Li, Y. J. (2014): Regulatory focus as a predictor of attitudes toward partitioned and combined pricing, in: Journal of Consumer Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 355–362. Morwitz, V. G./Greenleaf, E. A./Johnson, E. J. (1998): Divide and prosper: consumers’ reactions to partitioned prices, in: Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 453–463. Preacher, K. J./Rucker, D. D./Hayes, A. F. (2007): Addressing moderated mediation hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions, in: Multivariate Behavioral Research, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 185–227. Shugan, S. M. (1980): The cost of thinking, in: Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 7 No. 2, pp. 99–111. Spiller, S. A./Fitzsimons, G. J./Lynch Jr., J. G./McClelland, G. H. (2013): Spotlights, floodlights, and the magic number zero: Simple effects tests in moderated regression, in: Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 277–288. Tversky, A./Kahneman, D. (1974): Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, in: Science, Vol. 185 No. 4157, pp. 1124–1131. Völckner, F./Rühle, A./Spann, M. (2012): To divide or not to divide? The impact of partitioned pricing on the informational and sacrifice effects of price, in: Marketing Letters, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 719–730. Xia, L./Monroe, K. B./Cox, J. L. (2004): The price is unfair! A conceptual framework of price fairness perceptions, in: Journal of Marketing, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 1–15. Keywords Partitioned Pricing, Need for Cognition, Price Fairness, Tariffs 108 MARKETING · ZFP · Heft 2 · 2. Quartal 2015 Erhältlich im Buchhandel oder bei: vahlen.de | Verlag Franz Vahlen GmbH · 80791 München | bestellung@vahlen.de | Preise inkl. MwSt. | 163334 Die Marke: der Fels in der Brandung. Dieser Klassiker zur Markenführung zeigt die Rahmenbedingungen, Ziele und Grundsatzstrategien der Markenführung auf. Er stellt die Entwicklungen und Umsetzung der Markenidentität und Markenpositionierung ausführlich dar. Der Aufbau, die Gestaltung, die Kommunikation sowie das Wachstum von Marken werden detailliert analysiert. Komplexe Entscheidungen zur Markendehnung, zur Bildung von Markenallianzen sowie zur Führung von Markenportfolios und Markenarchitekturen beschreibt das Werk in bestechender Form. Die 8. Auflage berücksichtigt die aktuellen Entwicklungen insbesondere zu den Themen Social Media, virale Verbreitung von Markenbotschaften, Touch-point Management, Employer Branding und Internal Branding. Exzellent: der Autor Prof. Dr. Franz-Rudolf Esch ist Direktor des Instituts für Marken und Kommunikationsforschung an der EBS Business School in Oestrich-Winkel. Expertenmeinung »Ein großer Wurf … Alle wesentlichen Aspekte der Markenführung wurden wissenschaftlich anspruchsvoll im Brückenschlag zur Praxis aufgearbeitet.« Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Heribert Meffert Esch Strategie und Technik der Markenführung 8. Auflage. 2014. XXXIII, 790 Seiten. Gebunden € 49,80 ISBN 978-3-8006-4856-6 Portofrei geliefert: vahlen.de/13694773 Erhältlich im Buchhandel oder bei: vahlen.de | Verlag Franz Vahlen GmbH · 80791 München | bestellung@vahlen.de | Preise inkl. MwSt. | 164471 Das moderne Grundlagenwerk zum Marketing. Hollensen/Opresnik Marketing 2. Auflage. 2015. XVIII, 502 Seiten. Kartoniert € 39,80 ISBN 978-3-8006-4928-0 Neu im Mai 2015 Portofrei geliefert: vahlen.de/14255308 Das Lehrbuch behandelt in englischer Sprache eines der wichtigsten und aktuellsten Themenfelder des modernen Marketing und verbindet den klassischen Ansatz der strategischen Marketingplanung und seiner Instrumente mit dem neuen Ansatz des Relationship Marketing. Die Struktur des Buches orientiert sich an den einzelne Elementen der Marketingplanung und zeigt für die entsprechenden Phasen, Marketinginstrumente und strategischen Konzepte die Bedeutung und Möglichkeiten des Relationship Marketing-Ansatzes. Die 2. Auflage greift wichtige aktuelle Entwicklungen im Marketing auf und enthält neue Kapitel zum Marketing Research zur Datenanalyse im Planungsprozess des Marketing und zum Digital Marketing and Social Media. Pflichtlektüre für Praktiker, Studenten und Dozenten der Betriebswirtschaft. »... so wird graue Theorie zur leichten Lektüre.« in: Enable 04/2011, zur Vorauflage

Abstract

This study presents a conceptual replication of the effect of partitioned prices on consumer responses in a subscription service setting. Contrasting Morwitz/Greenleaf/Johnson’s (1998) seminal article, the results of an online experiment reveal that consumers are more likely to buy a subscription service with a partitioned tariff (i.e., a pay-per-use tariff) than with a combined tariff (i.e., a flat rate). This effect occurs even though all consumers are aware of the correct billing price and the billing price is identical in both conditions. However, the negative effect of the partitioned (vs. the combined) tariff on consumer responses is mitigated by high levels of need for cognition. Intriguingly, consumers extremely high in need for cognition show a reversed effect pattern when examining perceived price fairness as the dependent variable, that is, they perceive the partitioned tariff to be fairer than the combined tariff.

References

Abstract

Marketing ZFP is a platform for the academic dialog between marketing science and marketing practice. It offers critical depictions of the newest developments in the central areas of marketing science and marketing practice. Thereby, Marketing ZFP dedicates itself particularly to the transfer of methodological knowledge into practice.

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