
οὐδεμία γνῶσις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἑνός. ἢ ἐν μὲν ἐκείνος ἠκέφαλο ὁτι οὐδέν τῶν ἄλλων ἢ ἐκείνῳ δή δέ τι ἐγνωσσότοι; l'integrazione non sembra necessaria e appare piuttosto esplicativa di quanto espresso nelle parole che precedono.

517, 17–12 = III 342–343: Una igitur abnegatio omnibus ipsius contentua le omnit nullum ens omnit causae est omnit g: μια οὖν ἄκροφασι παραξακτική ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι τὸ ἑν, ἢ δὲ τούτως ὅτι καὶ δέ εἶστι ἀγνωσσότοι; l'integrazione non sembra necessaria e appare piuttosto esplicativa di quanto espresso nelle parole che precedono.

522, 22–25 = III 355: il commentario si conclude con un suggerimento richiamo al silenzio contemplativo (Silentio autem conclusit eann de ipsi theorem g: συγή δὲ συνεπεράντω τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ θεωρίαν), che segue la valde hand inopinabile conclusionem (πάντως τοῦ παράδοχον τὸ συμπέρασμα), come recita la interpretatio di Moerbeke. Precede un locus nondum sanatus, per qualche lacuna, tuttavia non concordemente segnata nei testimoni di g (cf. app. ad l.): Unde merito et Aristoteles coassequens ipsi ad indicibile ipsum e <...> dat nature entis. Nam per negari et ipse remouit <...> abnegationes αἰτὸν καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης συνεπόμενος αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρητον αὐτῷ ἀπέφησεν ἀρά τῷ γὰρ ἀποφάσεσθαι καὶ αὐτός ἀφέλεν <πάσας> τὰς ἀποφάσεις. Si il supplemento πάσας è ragionevole, ma non indispensabile, più difficile è ricostruire il testo dopo l'espressione ad indicibile ipsum e <...> dat nature entis. Il senso è tuttavia chiaro se si rapporta al corrispondente luogo del Parmenide: la conclusione ‘paradosse’ a cui perviene Parmenide a seguito delle molte negationes è che l’Uno non è in alcun modo né partecipa in nessun modo dell’essere (Parm. 141 e, 8: οὐδεμίας ἀφρ. ἐπεί τὸ ἑν; ma il discorso non è considerato concluso e con l’ultima domanda posta da Parmenide (hanc ultimam fecisse interrogationem: τὴν τελευταίαν ποιήσασθαι ἐρωτησάται) al giovane Aristotele va aperta la strada alla discussione di una seconda tesi: Parmenide chiede al giovane, che ha assentito a tutte le negazioni, se ritiene che tale possa essere la condizione dell’Uno (Parm. 142 a 2: ή δένεραν οἱν περὶ τὸ ἐν τεταία δὴ ἐνθαῦς ἐγείρετο). Nella risposta del giovane: ‘a me non pare possibile’ (Parm. 142 a 8: οὔχον ἐναγιον δοξεῖ), è la negatio negationum e la consapevolezza che v’è ancora strada da percorrere e che vi sono altre possibilità per giungere alla dimostrazione che l’Uno è, che partecipa dell’essere (è l’argomento della seconda tesi della prima ipotesi, alla quale manca, come detto, il commentario procliano). Si offre la possibilità – si sembra – di scrivere così il testo moerbekiano: Unde merito et Aristoteles coassequens ipsi ad indicibile ipsum et <etiam abnegavit et> dat le Unam naturae entis (vel: dat le Uni naturam entis). Nam per negari et ipse remouit <commenta> abnegationes (αἰτὸν εἰκότας καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης συνεπόμενος αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρητον, αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπέφησεν); καὶ τῷ ἔν τὸ φύσει εἶναι ἐθνως-τῷ γὰρ ἀποφάσεσθαι καὶ αὐτός ἀφέλεπ πάσας τὰς ἀποφάσεις).

L’edizione è arricchita da appendici e indices; soprattutto utili, l’edizione degli scholia di Σικέ Α, e l’Index fontium.

Napoli

Ugo Criscuolo


The issue of an author’s self-presentation can be over-emphasized, but its relevance in the case of Cicero is hard to doubt. After all, his extensive activity as a writer is to an important extent bound up with his political activity as a homo novus in the highly competitive environment of Republican Rome. There are, however, many pitfalls, and as it is expected to be received in a relatively new and fashionable...
topic, these are not always avoided in the growing body of scholarly literature on the subject.

Stephanie Kurczyk’s book, despite some problems of presentation, is a welcome contribution to the debate that raises important points of method.¹

Views on how to approach Cicero’s image as it emerges from his works have evolved considerably. Instructively, in the early 1940s Basel University invited submissions for an essay competition on the subject of Cicero’s ‘Selbstauffassung’; obviously, it was felt that it was time to hear Cicero’s own views of himself. The idea was in fact taken up only some twenty years later in Jürgen Graff’s Basel doctoral dissertation, published as Ciceros Selbstauffassung (Heidelberg 1963). Graff’s book, remarkably full and sensitive as it is, is based on the premise that even Cicero’s speeches show his real beliefs about himself.² The growing interest in rhetoric brought a different focus: in his Trials of Character (Chapel Hill 1988), James May takes the rhetorical concept of ‘ethos’ as his starting point, and accordingly he has much to say, as far as Cicero’s depiction of his own character and deeds is concerned, about its persuasive function in each of the speeches discussed. Lately, partly under the influence of Bourdieu’s ideas about social positioning, many scholars have interpreted Cicero’s writings, sometimes even including his private letters, as driven by his concern for presenting himself in a favourable light to his fellow-Romans. K. takes her cue from this recent development, concentrating on the explicitly autobiographical passages. She contributes some good and sensitive interpretations, but more crucially, addresses the difficult and important question of the tension between Cicero’s self-presentation as a rhetorical tool and as a political strategy.

K. starts with two introductory chapters about autobiographical writing, one general and the other on Cicero. The three remaining, long chapters then discuss autobiography in Cicero’s epics, in his speeches (most speeches receiving a separate treatment), and in a selection of his treatises.

Cicero’s epics Consulatus Suus and De Temporibus Suis are the most unambiguously self-presentational of Cicero’s writings. K.’s chapter on these is somewhat repetitive, and in an attempt at full coverage broaches questions which then receive only an inconclusive treatment.³ But her discussion is generally illuminating (a good summary 113). It achieves an excellent balance between, on the one hand, identification and analysis of Cicero’s aims and methods, and, on the other hand, recognition of his failure to convince his contemporaries; as such it goes beyond, e.g., Steel’s recent discussion.⁴ She also convincingly argues against Hose’s view (Hermes 123, 1995, 455–69) that in Consulatus Suus, Cicero emphasizes the autonomy of his actions against the Catilinarians (100–2); rather, he depicts himself als

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¹ I must apologize for the tardiness of this review.
² See esp. 31, and his rejection (116–7 n. 89) of Strasburger’s interpretation of Cicero’s remarks about himself as solely politically motivated. My information about the Basel «Preisaufgabe für das Jahr 1942» is taken from Graff’s «Vorwort» (5).
³ E.g., the question of the title of Cicero’s first epic (Consulatus Suus – thus plausibly Courtney, FLP 156 – or De consulatu suo) is irrelevant here and does not merit K.’s full scholarly references (81–2); but given this fullness, it is irritating that no real picture emerges of the nature of the question or of the evidence.
⁴ Catherine Steel, Reading Cicero (London 2005), esp. 60–1.
Kurczyk, Cicero und die Inszenierung der eigenen Vergangenheit

Werkzeug der Götter», a move significantly parallel to his contentions, in other apologetic contexts, that he followed the authority of the Senate.

K.’s chapter on the speeches is the most innovative, even if the basic picture of the development of Cicero’s image as constructed and/or reflected in his oratory is the same as that offered by May (whom she often quotes): first, Cicero is the young and relatively inexperienced, but diligent orator who courageously takes on the greater power and influence of his adversaries; later, he becomes the (ex)consul with great auctoritas, who insists on his own role as a dux togatus, as the saviour of Rome from the destruction planned by the conspirators; after his exile he depicts himself as having again saved Rome by his departure, as the personification of the state, and as unanimously supported by all the boni; and after the awkward interlude of the Caesarian speeches, Cicero emerges in the Philippics as the authoritative advocate of war, pitted against the anti-Roman, evil Antony. K. offers many fine-tuned remarks on the effectiveness of Cicero’s choice of expression (e.g., 144 on Div. Caec. 1 lasserim ... accusandum) and other interpretive matters (e.g., 153 on the contrast between Verres and Cicero in Verr. 2,4,74–5); and she is illuminating, e.g., on Phil. 2 (279–91). The discussion of Planc. is particularly good (255–62), including that of the famous passage Planc. 64–6, where Cicero describes how as a young quaestor he believed that his achievements were the talk of the town in Rome: K. well brings out how carefully Cicero has constructed this rhetorically effective, ironic portrait of his naïve younger self.

More generally, she has an interesting take on the post-exile speeches, in that she repeatedly points out in detail that there is a tension between two views of the exile both found in the speeches (esp. 223 on Dom. 5; 241–2 on Har.; 260–1): Cicero presents himself, on the one hand, as the victim of Clodius’ violence, which drove him out; on the other hand, as the patriot who, in an act of selfless devotio akin to that of the heroic P. Decius Mus and his son, made the conscious choice to go abroad in order to save the Republic from armed civil conflict. I doubt whether the two are truly incompatible, as K. claims. After all, Cicero combines them a few times (Dom. 5 cedere coegisti; Planc. 26), and the idea is surely that Clodius’ violence was able to drive him out (depellere) precisely because he chose not to organize armed resistance, but to withdraw (cedere) instead. Yet K. is right that a tension exists, witness also Cicero’s presentation of them as (albeit non-exclusive) alternatives in Planc. 26: me vel vi pulsum vel ratione cedentem. Importantly, she shows that Cicero chooses to emphasize the one or the other perspective according to the rhetorical needs of the case he is making.

Which brings me to perhaps the most crucial point addressed by K. (see, programmatically, 134–5; 293–4): the relationship between autobiographical elements

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1 See the excellent summary May, Trials 164–5.
2 The element of the unanimity of this support is somewhat underplayed by May 88–127 (see esp. 104–1) as well as K. (223–4, 268–70); see Graff, Selbststiftung 116–8 nn. 89–92 for a full collection of evidence.
4 The latter, e.g., in Red. Pop. 1; see esp. May, Trials 97–8.
as ‘Selbstzweck’ (that is, as part of Cicero’s attempts to mould the image that his fellow Romans had of him) and as a rhetorical instrument (that is, as a device to enhance the persuasiveness of the particular case he is arguing in each particular speech). As K. points out (134–5), Mommsen saw the former as the dominant factor in Cicero’s speeches, accusing him of a vain egotism that made him forget his duty as a pleader; while Rahn, as early as 1959, contended that Cicero’s talk about himself was «nur eine rhetorische Waffe». In English-language scholarship, the latter view was particularly forcefully formulated by Gotoff, who maintained «that nothing in a speech by Cicero is wasted on egotistic self-indulgence or obviously gratuitous stroking of the audience. ... victory was what Cicero’s profession was all about» (ClPh 81, 1986, 124). May, to the extent that he focussed on the persuasive ends of Cicero’s depictions of character (‘ethos’), subscribed to this view, reminding us of the effectiveness of Cicero’s strategy in court cases (Trials 87; cf. 165–6); yet he also devised a full and convincing picture of the several stages of Cicero’s conscious image-building in the context of Roman society at large (above) (e.g., 104–5); in the end, he seemed to see the two as compatible, as two sides of the same coin. More recent scholarship often returns to the idea that Cicero’s self-presentation was a goal in itself, though pursued not for reasons of vanity but as a savvy political strategy; and this strategic goal is often supposed simply to take precedence over rhetorical and other considerations. It is the merit of K.’s book that she confronts the potential conflict between the two.

Accordingly, she rightly relies on interpreting the individual speeches, rather than on a preconceived notion of the relationship between the political and the rhetorical aspects. Both, she concludes, not just one or the other, were important in all phases of Cicero’s career; but more specifically, she proposes a refined developmental picture (292–4): in the early stage, the rhetorical goal of the autobiographical elements dominates; and in and after 65 BC, the need for self-justification leads to more emphasis on apology, culminating in the publication of the corpus of consular speeches in 60 (not coincidentally, also the year of Consulatus Suus); in the 50’s, after his exile, his self-justification was even more important, occasionally even marginalizing his client’s case, as in Sest. (cf. K. 262). K., then, on the basis of her thorough, detailed examination of the individual speeches, urges us not to disregard the persuasive goals of the speeches; yet she basically supports the view that, at least in the post-exile speeches, Cicero’s self-presentation as a goal in its own right sometimes overrides the persuasive concerns of each particular case.

To my mind, K.’s balanced view, welcome as it is, is not wholly satisfactory. In particular, does the ‘image-building’ side of (some of) the post-exile speeches really dominate the rhetorical side? Several factors at least urge further caution. (1) As mentioned above, K. clearly shows that Cicero’s picture of his exile varies considerably between speeches, and is dependent on the rhetorical needs of each case. (2) Craig, in an article merely referred to by K. (237 n. 468), has argued that even in Sest., the actual charge of vis is much more important than usually allowed for.¹ (3) Sest. (like Har., Prov., and Pis.) is of course nevertheless far more centred on Cicero himself than Planc. is, but this is not necessarily simply a matter of Cicero

having become more restrained in the latter speech, as K. seems to suggest (262: «... daß sich Cicero ... wieder zurückgenommen hat»); the difference makes excellent rhetorical sense. Sestius’ vis had been committed in the service of Cicero’s recall (see esp. Sest. 14, 31), so Cicero’s self-justification is at the same time a justification of Sestius’ actions;1 while Plancius’ case was not in itself connected with Cicero, and Cicero’s pronouncements about Plancius’ assistance during his exile, long as they still are (12–102), serve the relatively restricted goal of rebutting the prosecutors’ claims that Cicero’s undertaking of the defence was inappropriate, as he had no real connection to Plancius at all. (4) K.’s concentration on autobiographical material distorts the picture. By definition, she leaves out speeches from the same period, such as Cael. and Rab. Post., that have no significant autobiographical elements. Yet their publication was surely as much a conscious decision as that of the more or less heavily ‘autobiographical’ ones. Particularly Cicero’s easy-going, jocular persona in Cael., and the extremely effective concentration on the rhetorical goal of getting Caelius acquitted, should remind us that Cicero’s publications were not straightforwardly focussed on publicizing his view of his own exile.

The problem may well be that K., taking the two views of Mommsen and Rahn as her starting point, describes the possible functions of self-presentation in the speeches in terms of a scale between these two extremes: a «Skala zwischen rhetorischem Instrument und Selbstzweck» (293). It may do her own nuanced conclusions more justice to see the two – in an extension of May’s approach – as only potentially in conflict. Perhaps in some cases, Cicero felt he could pursue both goals at the same time, in others that there was a tension but that he could insert some image-building without damage to persuasion, and again in others that aiming for victory excluded politically useful references to himself. We should, I believe, hold on to the tenet of Rahn, Gotoff, and others that in judicial speeches «victory was what Cicero’s profession was all about» (4 view, after all, supported not only by Cicero’s continued effectiveness as an orator, but also by his own theoretical works), while acknowledging that this often left Cicero considerable room for pursuing other goals at the same time. K.’s discussion of the speeches, then, is not the last word. But it is an important step forward.

Her chapter on the treatises is far less rewarding, as it exhibits precisely some of the weaknesses that she manages to avoid and question in her discussion of the speeches. Whereas in the speeches she fully acknowledges the existence of an alternative goal (persuasion), she apparently sees the rhetorical and philosophical treatises of 46–44 BC solely as vehicles for Cicero’s continuing attempts to retain a political presence: she seems to claim as much in the introductory pages (295–8), and her actual analyses show very little interest in any other motives Cicero may have had. It remains unclear why Cicero should think that he could earn political credit, e.g., with highly technical treatises like the Academica or De fato – works that K. tellingly avoids. Of course, Cicero himself makes well-known, grand claims for his philosophical activities as an alternative way of benefiting his country. Yet on a personal level, as many remarks in the letters as well as the philosophica illus-

trate, philosophy was an animi medicina for him after his daughter’s death (cf. K. 345 with n. 223 – however reluctantly she admits this). His claims to be driven by the wish to benefit his country are (an insight of Graff’s worth rescuing from being hidden in a note: Selbstaußfassung 143 n. 78), it seems, nowhere found in the letters, but only in the philosophical prefaces; this does not make these claims necessarily untrue, but does show that they are far from the whole story.

In her discussion of Brutus, this one-sided view leads, e.g., to an interpretation of Cicero’s treatment of Hortensius’ career as a series of rather crude attempts at denigrating the latter (e.g., K. 316 on Brut. 318). But Cicero’s ‘agenda’ of proving his own superiority is surely better served by showing that he was better even than the very good Hortensius. Moreover, K. neglects the wider anti-Atticist, polemical context of the work. Brut. 323–7 (esp. 325–7), also read by K. (120–1) as merely critical of Hortensius, must at the same time be understood as an attempt at defending him, and at thereby taking the sting out of the Atticists’ criticisms of Cicero’s own alleged Asianism. For as Leeman showed long ago, Brut. 327 implies that Hortensius had been criticized by Brutus along Atticist lines.

The most important part of the book, that on the speeches, is unfortunately somewhat marred by problems of presentation: the structure of the argument is too often obscured by the use of overlong paragraphs (e.g. 175–9, 203–7, 265–8) and footnotes are often very general or otherwise superfluous (e.g. 172 n. 221, 175 n. 229). Also, K.’s detailed discussions of some 33 speeches does not avoid unhelpful repetition, which sometimes leaves the distinctive character of individual speeches unclear. The long discussion in the first chapter about modern theories of modern autobiography (19–42) is potentially interesting but contributes virtually nothing to the argument. And most vexingly of all, K. has done herself and her readers a real disservice by not providing an index: the many good observations and analyses that she does provide are therefore bound to be far less used than they deserve.

But the strong points of K.’s book outweigh the weak ones, and particularly her well-founded challenging of some emerging orthodoxies is salutary. We can look forward to her future work.

Newcastle upon Tyne


Si la critique moderne s’est régulièrement penchée sur la littérature antique à travers le prisme de la dichotomie de l’écrit et de l’oral, la période augustéenne,

1 A. D. Leeman, Orationis Ratio (Amsterdam 1963), 95 with n. 14.